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Executive Summary
Intellectual property rights (IPR) create incentives for research but impose static
efficiency losses and other costs. In this essay, we discuss recent proposals of
other mechanisms for rewarding innovation and argue that incremental experi-
mentation with mechanisms that supplement rather than replace IPR can help
to test and refine these mechanisms without undermining existing institutions.
Prizes, such as those recently offered by the X‐Prize Foundation, have been suc-
cessful in spurring research but have typically targeted demonstration projects
rather than innovations capable of being used at scale. To spur the creation of
products for widespread use, the design of prizes could be usefully extended by
conditioning rewards on a market test, as in the recent $1.5 billion pilot Ad-
vance Market Commitment (AMC) for a pneumococcus vaccine.
I. Introduction
Economic growth depends on technological progress, and the nonrival
nature of scientific knowledge generated by research and development
(R&D) implies that institutions beyond competitive markets are re-
quired to promote innovation. Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) such
as patents are one such institution.
However, there recently has been a resurgence of academic and policy
concern over the costs imposed by patents and a renewed interest in al-
ternative policy proposals. In this essay, we discuss some of these pro-
posals and argue that incremental experimentation with mechanisms
that would be voluntary alternatives or supplements to IPR could be
used to test and refine these mechanisms while at the same time limiting
the risk of undermining the expectations of reward critical to the current
IPR system.
We first discuss some of the trade‐offs arising under patent systems
and briefly outline three other mechanisms that have been proposed as
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arising under patent systems—prizes, Advance Market Commitments
(AMCs), and the proposed Medical Innovation Prize Fund (Sec. II). In
Section III, we compare the triggers for reward payments under these
mechanisms and argue that the impact of the mechanisms is likely to
be sensitive to the design of these triggers. We argue that in contexts
where sponsors wish to spur not just demonstration projects but, rather,
innovations capable of being used at scale, the design of prizes—such
as those recently offered by the X‐Prize Foundation—can be usefully
extended by conditioning rewards on a market test, as in the recent
$1.5 billion pilot AMC for a pneumococcus vaccine. We then review
the distinction between voluntary mechanisms (i.e., mechanisms that
supplement the current system of IPR) and mandatory mechanisms (i.e.,
mechanismsthatreplace the currentsystemofIPR)forrewarding innova-
tion (Sec. IV). Because the current system of innovation relies on firms
anticipating that they will receive IPR, we argue that voluntary mecha-
nisms will involvelower risks of undermining expectations that research
will be rewarded than would mandatory mechanisms. We then focus on
an approach for incremental exper i m e n t a t i o nw i t h i nA M Cd e s i g ni n
more detail (in Sec. V), focusing first on technologically closer products
(such as a pneumococcus vaccine) and later on technologically more dis-
tantproducts(suchasamalaria,tuberculosis,orHIVvaccine).SectionVI
concludes.
II. Patents and Other Mechanisms for Rewarding Innovation
Research and development can be promoted either through up‐front
support for R&D inputs (so‐called push programs) or through commit-
ments to reward successful products (so‐called pull incentives). There is
ample evidence that innovation responds to incentives (Griliches 1957;
Schmookler 1966; Hayami and Ruttan 1971; Acemoglu and Linn 2004;
Finkelstein 2004; Brunt, Lerner, and Nicholas 2008), and patents are one
example of an institution that uses incentives to reward innovation.
Patents provide incentives for innovation by allowing the developers
of new products a period of market exclusivity. Patents involve a trade‐
off between the benefit of providing dynamic incentives for innovation
and the cost of providing these incentives in a way that imposes static
distortions—that is, because patents make goods more expensive to
consumers, at the margin some goods will not be used even when their
social value exceeds the cost of production.
1
Kremer and Williams 2Note that the patent system is fragile in the sense that it is dependent
on firms’ expectations about future rewards. These expectations may be
easiertodestroythantocreate,inpartbecauseabenevolentsocialplanner
consideringthe creation of a new IPRsystemwill face a time‐consistency
problem. Depending on the difficulty of establishing reputation, a social
planner with a reputation for protecting IPR may choose to keep an ex-
isting system of IPR in place, while a social planner without a reputation
may find that the static costs of maintaining an IPR system exceed the
expected dynamic benefits.
The patent system does not result in a first‐best outcome, and, under
reasonable assumptions, patents are not even the constrained optimal
mechanism for a planner facing asymmetric information on the value of
newinventions(Chari,Golosov,andTsyvinski2008).Yet,onehypothesis
for why we have not observed alternative pull institutions expand
widely historically is that there have been political economy difficulties
in the implementation of alternatives. Jaffe and Lerner (2004) argue that
firms engaged in R&D under the patent system face substantial risks of
as‐yet unknown or untested patents being asserted against them.
2 How-
ever, one benefit of patents is that they create at least a rough link be-
tween the desirability of a product to consumers and the reward to
inventors. Patents thus avoid situations in which some authority has
wide discretion to reward nonuseful innovations, whereas alternatives
to the patent system could potentially destroy this link and reward rent
seeking rather than desired innovation.
As an example, consider the £20,000 prize offered in the 1700s by the
Britishgovernment.Theprizeaimedtospurthedevelopmentofamethod
forshipstodeterminetheirlongitudewhileatsea.TheBoardofLongitude
expected astronomers and mathematicians to develop a solution through
celestialobservationsofthepositionsandmotionsofheavenlybodies,but,
infact,thesolutionwasdevelopedbyaclockmakernamedJohnHarrison.
Harrison developed a timepiece that was sufficiently accurate to deter-
mine time at the port of departure even on ships subject to usual sources
ofbiassuchasmoistureandvibration.Thecommitteeaskedforrepeated
tests of Harrison’s chronometer, and it took 12 years of tests to prove the
worth of Harrison’s invention to the committee and to reward him with
hisprize.Thisexampleoffersseverallessonsthatcanguidefutureattempts
totest and refine prize mechanisms. On the one hand, the Longitude prize
“worked” in the sense that it was successful in spurring the development
of the desired product. On the other hand, at least by some accounts, the
prize made it overly complicated for Harrison to collect his prize, both
because the chronometer solution did not fit the preconceptions of the
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was not well specified in advance. In her popular book on the subject,
Sobel (1996) argued that these delays were unnecessary; others have ar-
gued that the Board of Longitude was justified in requiring these tests.
In recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in both alter-
natives and supplements to the current system of IPR motivated by the
idea that alternative types of mechanisms for rewarding innovation
may better mitigate some of the trade‐offs arising under the patent sys-
tem. Below, we briefly outline three mechanisms that have recently at-
tracted attention—prizes (Sec. II.A), Advance Market Commitments
(Sec. II.B), and the proposed Medical Innovation Prize Fund (Sec. II.C).
3
It is worth noting that even though today we view the patent system
as integral to supporting our system of innovation, the patent system
required both time and trial‐and‐error to develop. Since the first U.S.
Patent Act was put in place in 1790, rules have developed on what is
allowed to be patented, who is allowed to file patents, how long patents
can be held, and so forth. The patent system has arguably offered ex-
amples of failures in both directions—that is, the awarding of rewards
to innovations that should not have been rewarded and the denial of re-
wards to innovations that should have been rewarded—but, over time,
thepatentsystemhasevolvedtoovercomeatleastsometypesoffailures.
Other innovation mechanisms such as those described below would
similarly require time and trial‐and‐error to be tested and refined.
A. Prizes
In recent years there has been renewed interest in prizes or commit-
ments to reward innovators who meet a set of technical specifications
laid out in advance. For example, the X‐Prize Foundation offered a
$10 million prize for the first nongovernmental organization to launch
a reusable, manned spacecraft into space twice within 2 weeks. This
prize was awarded in 2004 to a team led by aircraft designer Burt Rutan
and financed by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen. Similar subsequent
X‐Prizes were later announced—including the Archon X‐Prize in 2006
and the Google Lunar X‐Prize in 2007. As another example, in 2008 U.S.
Senator John McCain (R‐AZ) proposed a $300 million prize for a car
battery that would “leapfrog” the abilities of current hybrid and electric
cars.
Prizes have historically focused on providing incentives for demon-
stration projects rather than products ready to be used at scale, and thus
have tended not to focus on promoting access to new technologies
Kremer and Williams 4conditional on successful development. That said, prizes could promote
accessiftheyincludedrequirementsforpatentstobeplacedinthepublic
domain or for a product be sold at a particular price.
Many prizes involve cash payments, but the fast‐track regulatory ap-
provalincentiveproposedbyDavidRidley,HenryGrabowski,and Jeffrey
Moe (2006), and recently implemented in the United States, can also be
considereda prize.Inexchangefordevelopingatreatmentfor aneglected
disease, this pull incentive rewards pharmaceutical companies by fast‐
tracking regulatory (e.g., FDA) approval on either targeted products
(i.e.,the drugsto treatneglecteddiseases)orother,moreprofitablemedi-
cines (the program uses vouchers that are transferable both across prod-
ucts and across firms). To the extent that fast‐track regulatory approval
hasnoadverseeffects,thisprovidesanincentivetopharmaceuticalfirms
at very low cost.
B. Advance Market Commitments
Advance Market Commitments are similar to prizes but condition re-
ward payments on use of the product (a feature we refer to as a “market
test,” described below). We here focus on the application of AMCs to the
case of vaccines for neglected diseases concentrated in poor countries,
because policy discussions of AMCs have largely focused on that appli-
cation. For additional discussions of AMCs, see Kremer (2001a, 2001b),
Kremer and Glennerster (2004), and Barder, Kremer, and Levine (2005).
Under an AMC, one or more sponsors legally commit—in advance of
product development and licensure—to underwrite a guaranteed price
for a maximum numberof predefined purchases of the vaccine. Vaccines
are eligible if a committee deems that they fulfill a set of technical speci-
fications laid out in advance, such as the maximum number of needed
doses, the required level of efficacy in a certain population, and so forth.
Sponsorsguaranteetoprovideatop‐uppayment(say,$15pertreatment)
conditional on poor countries expressing demand for a given product
and paying (or other qualified purchasers, paying on their behalf) a low,
relatively affordable price (say, $1 per treatment). The higher, guaranteed
price provides a return for developers of the product, and, in exchange,
these developers agree to a cap on the long‐run price that they charge
fortheproduct(oragreetolicensethetechnologytoothermanufacturers).
If no suitable product is developed, no AMC payments would be made.
Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Russia, and the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation recently announced a $1.5 billion pilot AMC
for a pneumococcus vaccine suitable for children in the developing
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4 United Kingdom Prime Minister Gordon Brown has suggested
that this be the first in a series of AMCs to encourage the development
of vaccines against diseases affecting the developing world.
C. Medical Innovation Prize Funds
Under the Medical Innovation Prize Fund proposal, described by Love
(2005), developers of new products would be financially rewarded
through payments from a Medical Innovation Prize Fund rather than
through market exclusivity.
5 Generic companies would be allowed to
freely compete.
Love (2005) proposes that the total size of the fund be 0.5% of U.S.
gross domestic product and that this be shared across new products
based on the estimated incremental health benefits, although he also
notes that some of the fund could be earmarked for priority projects,
such as neglected diseases and orphan drugs. Note that in contrast to
AMCs, which focus on a specific product, the proposed Medical Inno-
vation Prize Fund covers a much wider domain (virtually all pharma-
ceutical research). The payments to participating firms are proposed to
be paid out over 10 years and to be based on the estimated incremental
health benefits of new products. A version of this proposal was intro-
duced in the U.S. House of Representatives in 2005 by Representative
Bernard Sanders (I‐VT) in HR 417—the Medical Innovation Prize Act of
2005.
To preview the argument made in the remainder of this essay, we
propose the following agenda for incremental experimentation with
such alternative mechanisms. To lower the risks of undermining expec-
tations that research will be rewarded, we propose initially experiment-
ing with voluntary mechanisms that supplement the current system of
IPR rather than mandatory mechanisms that would replace the patent
system. Prizes for demonstration projects, such as those recently offered
by the X‐Prize Foundation, are a natural starting point. To move prizes
closer to a point wherethey stimulate research on innovations capable of
being used at scale, it will be useful to experiment with different ways of
incorporating market tests into reward payments—as, for example, with
the pilot AMC. Experimentation with AMCs will likely also inform the
design of other mechanisms incorporating morecomplex ex post reward
triggers, such as the proposed Medical Innovation Prize Fund. Based on
the results of such experimentation, mandatory mechanisms could then
be better assessed.
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Triggers for Reward Payments
Ideally, mechanisms for rewarding innovation would credibly commit
to reward appropriate innovations while not committing sponsors to
pay for innovations that end up not being useful or desirable.
6 The de-
sign of triggers for reward payments needs to balance these objectives.
In this section we discuss three potential elements of a system for trig-
gering reward payments: fulfillment of technical specifications set
ex ante (Sec. III.A); measures of ex post use, willingness to pay, or impact
(Sec. III.B); and ex post discretion (Sec. III.C). As we discuss below, most
mechanisms will use a combination of two or three of these triggers.
A. Ex Ante Technical Specifications
Technical specifications set ex ante are a feature of many prizes. For ex-
ample, the Wolfskehl Prize, established in 1908, pledged to reward the
first person to prove Fermat’s Last Theorem. For such mathematics
prizes, sponsors can very clearly describe in advance what they are
looking for. A series of prizes established in 1959 by Henry Kremer
sought to encourage innovation in human‐powered flight by offering
prizes for demonstration projects, including the first human‐powered
aircraft to fly a figure eight around two markers one‐half mile apart,
starting and ending the course at least 10 feet above the ground.
If the aim is not just to encourage proofs of mathematical theorems or
demonstration projects but, instead, to encourage applied innovations
that will see widespread use, it may be difficult to lay out all relevant
criteria as ex ante technical specifications. Moreover, in some cases—
such as for Post‐it Notes or the graphical user interface (referred to as
GUI) technology—the sponsor likely could not have described the prod-
uct specifically enough in advance for this type of reward trigger to be
useful.
B. Metrics of Ex Post Use, Willingness to Pay, or Impact
One issue with basing reward payments solely on technical specifica-
tions set ex ante is that products may be developed that, in a strict sense,
meet the technical specification but for some reason are not desirable to
consumers. The aviation prizes discussed above, for example, were pri-
marilyintended toprovide incentivesfordemonstrationprojects—not for
theproductionofcommerciallyusableproducts.Althoughdemonstration
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nismsthataimtospurthedevelopmentofproductsthatwouldbedesirable
forconsumers,itmayoftenbeusefultobaserewardpayments,atleastin
part, on some measure of ex post valuation of the product by consumers.
Under AMCs, the reward to the company is not paid simply for de-
velopment of a product that meets a set of technical specifications but,
rather, is tied to actual adoption and use of that product. In the case of
vaccines, the practical implementation of this requirement is eased, in
that vaccines used in poor countries are largely purchased through gov-
ernments and these vaccine purchases can be tracked relatively easily.
Basing AMC payments in part on this measure of ex post use provides
incentives for companies to focus their R&D efforts on products that
actually would be used rather than on a product that somehow fits a
set of predecided technical specifications but is not a good fit with what
developing countries need or want.
Medical Innovation Prize Funds propose basing reward payments on
the measured incremental health benefits. This requires ex post assess-
ment not only of use but of social value per user. AMCs for vaccines that
did not previously exist offer a relatively easy case by which to calculate
the total social value of the vaccine: the total social value of the vaccine is
equal to the number of users multiplied by the benefit per user, the latter
of which can be thought of as efficacy of the vaccine multiplied by the
expected burden of the disease to an individual (which can be estimated
ex ante). However, in most other cases, a given product will be a substi-
tute for and/or complement to other products currently on the market
and may be effective for some patients but not others. Appropriately cal-
culating the incremental health benefits of a new technology ex post
would require taking into account these factors, thereby leaving con-
siderable room for discretion. Small‐scale experimentation by deci-
sion makers with various ways of valuing new products under such a
mechanism likely would be valuable.
C. Ex Post Discretion
Essentially any mechanism for rewarding innovation will involve some
sortofexpostdiscretion.
7However,mechanismsvaryinhowmuchexpost
discretion is allowed and to whom ex post discretion is allocated.
The issue of how much ex post discretion to allow can be thought of
along a continuum. For example, a committee given a relatively high
amount of discretion is used to award the Nobel Peace Prize, whereas
thecommitteethatawardstheNobelPrize forchemistryhasmorelimited
Kremer and Williams 8discretion, given the bounds of the field within which the prize must be
relevant. The committee for the Wolfskehl Prize mentioned above had
even less discretion.
Decision makers may have incentives to reward based on different
criteria ex ante relative to ex post. Ex ante the committee may want
to reward innovation, but ex post the committee may have other pref-
erences. For example, the committee could prefer to reward those who
are likely to make the best use of the prize money going forward. Com-
mittees could also be subject to political capture or could choose to
“raise the bar” ex post. The Longitude example, discussed above, illus-
trates some of these potential problems.
One way to address the potential concern of committees raising the
bar ex post is to require that the committee award a certain amount of
money within a given time frame. Such a requirement is often used in
architectural contests, where a committee must choose a winner to
award a given contract to by a specified deadline. In architectural con-
tests, committees are relatively certain to receive a sufficient number of
high‐quality entrants such that choosing the best entrant will likely not
result in a poor outcome. Thus, although a payment would have to be
made no matter what, the risk that the committee will have to award
the contract to an undesirable proposal is low.
However, in other contexts this may be more of a concern. With very
challenging technological goals, such as the development of an HIV
vaccine, the probability that no firm would have a high‐quality vaccine
available at a given deadline is much higher. Moreover, in markets with
a small number of firms, the firms could potentially collude to slow
innovation.
The proposed Medical Innovation Prize Fund uses a version of this
type of requirement, but for several reasons this type of requirement is
less of a concern in that context. For the proposed Medical Innovation
Prize Fund, there is a commitment to award a certain amount of money
each year, but the scope of coverage is great enough—covering virtually
all pharmaceutical research—to smooth out variations in the arrival of
eligible products and to minimize opportunities for collusion across
firms.
Basing reward payments in part on ex post use is one way of leaving
ex post discretion relatively more in the hands of consumers instead of
in the hands of a committee, and doing so can limit the amount of dis-
cretion given to a committee and also help address concerns of time‐
inconsistency problems or political capture. The ex post use measure
ideallywouldbeobjectiveanddifficultforparticipatingfirmstomanipulate.
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poor countries are largely purchased through governments, and these
vaccine purchases can be tracked relatively easily. However, in the case
o ft h ep r o p o s e dM e d i c a lI n n o v a t i o nP r i z eF u n d ,m e a s u r e m e n to ft h e
value of a product (rather than the use of a product) is much less clear,
and this may introduce substantial opportunities for ex post discretion,
which potentially could lead to both static costs of rent seeking and dy-
namic losses from inappropriate incentives. Consider as an example the
value of a new drug that extends life for a terminal patient by 6 months,
during which time the patient is still disabled and requires care by med-
icalproviders.Thevalueofthese6monthsisthennotsimplythevalueof
6 months of a statistical life but, rather, this amount less the value of
capitaland laborinputsthat are required forthe patientover thatperiod.
Such calculations may be quite difficult.
Problems may also arise when trying to assess how to divide reward
payments across complementary innovations. Consider the example
where a new medical innovation requires two technologies. Assume
that the first technology, A, has high, fixed R&D costs and is sold by
a monopolist. Assume that the second technology has a relatively
low cost of development and production and that any of 15 substitute
products wouldbesuitable(1, …,15, indexedbyproductioncosts where
1 has the lowest production costs and 15 has the highest production
costs). Under the proposed Medical Innovation Prize Fund, a committee
wouldneedtodecidehowtodistributerentsacrossAandoneofthe1–15
substitute products but would likely not know that it was rel-
atively low cost for innovators to develop the latter product. Mistakes
in the division of rewards between innovators could cause distortions
of R&D investments for the two complementary products.
IV. Mandatory versus Voluntary Institutions
Public policies to provide incentives for innovation can either be
voluntary—so that firms could continue to rely on existing IPR systems—
or be mandatory—in the sense that firms would no longerhave access to
the IPR system that is currently in place. Both X‐Prizes and AMCs are
voluntarymechanisms, whereas the MedicalInnovationPrizeFund pro-
posal is a mandatory mechanism.
Mandatory programs such as the proposed Medical Innovation Prize
Fund would replace the current IPR system. Whether the incentives
provided by such an alternative system would be higher or lower than
Kremer and Williams 10the level of incentives provided by the current IPR system would be a
function of the size of the prize fund. Voluntary programs such as
X‐Prizes and AMCs, on the other hand, would supplement the current
IPR system and thus at least weakly increase the total available incen-
tives for R&D—since, if the price in a voluntary program were set low
enough such that firms would realize lower revenue if they chose to par-
ticipate than they would realize if they chose not to participate, presum-
ably firms would select out of participating in the voluntary mechanism.
Because, as argued above, the current system of IPR depends on
firms’ expectations of future rewards, experimenting with voluntary
mechanisms involves lower risks than with mandatory mechanisms.
If an experiment with a voluntary mechanism shows promise, it can
be refined and applied in a broader range of settings; if it fails, the vol-
untary mechanism can either be revised or abandoned. In contrast, if an
experiment with a mandatory mechanism fails, it may shake the confi-
dence of R&D investors, who may be concerned that IPR will disappear
and that no adequate alternative incentives will take its place to reward
them for their investments. Mandatory mechanisms for encouraging
innovationcannotbecostlesslyturnedonandoffbecauseofthedynamic
element inherent in any market in which firms make long‐term R&D
investments.
V. Design Issues for Early and Late Stage Advance
Market Commitments
We argued above that although prizes such as those recently offered by
the X‐Prize Foundation are a natural starting point for encouraging in-
novation, in many contexts the design of prizes could be usefully ex-
tended by conditioning rewards on a market test. Because AMCs are
a voluntary mechanism that incorporates one type of market test, ex-
perimentation with AMCs can likely inform the design of other mech-
anisms incorporating more complex ex post reward triggers, such as
the proposed Medical Innovation Prize Fund. In this section, we discuss
one approach for incremental experimentation within AMCs in more
detail, focusing on how initial experimentation with AMCs for techno-
logically closer products (such as a pneumococcus vaccine) can inform
the design of AMCs for technologically more distant products (such as
a malaria, tuberculosis, or HIV vaccine). We also discuss important dif-
ferences between AMC design for technologically closer and more dis-
tant products.
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ment in Washington, DC (Barder et al. 2005), it was argued that AMCs
could likely be applied cost‐effectively to both technologically closer
products and to technologically more distant products. Policy makers
suggested initially focusing on a technologically closer product, which
motivated the pilot pneumococcal vaccine AMC. One motivation for
this initial focus on technologically closer products could be that AMCs
for technologically closer products are “simpler” in the sense that they
primarilyseektospeedadoptionanddiffusion ofnewvaccines,whereas
AMCs for technologically more distant products seek to accomplish this
goaland alsotomoredirectlyspurnewR&Dinvestments into candidate
vaccines.
However, there are several substantive differences between how an
AMC should be designed for technologically closer products relative to
technologically more distant products, two of which we discuss below:
the appropriate price provided to developers (Sec. V.A) and the appro-
priate role for demand guarantees (Sec. V.B). For more discussion of
these issues, see Kremer, Levin, and Snyder (2008).
A. Setting Prices under an AMC
A first difference between designing AMCs for technologically closer
and technologically more distant products arises in thinking about
how vaccine prices under an AMC should be set. For a technologically
closer vaccine like pneumococcus, much of the R&D has already been
completed, and the challenge is primarily one of designing a long‐term
procurement contract that will incentivize a small number of specific
firms that have the necessary expertise to construct the large‐scale ca-
pacity needed to serve the world’s poorest countries as well as the rich‐
and middle‐income world. If policy makers knew how much it would
take to get the one or two specific firms that can currently produce child-
hood pneumococcus vaccine or are likely to be able to do so in the near
future to participate in an AMC, they would set the AMC price at that
levelbutnohigher.Thishighlightsatrade‐offbetweentherisksofsetting
the price too high or too low. The risk of setting the price too high is that
more will be spent on the AMC mechanism than is necessary. The risk
ofsettingthepricetoolowisthatfirmswillnotbuildthecapacityneeded
to serve poor country markets and that the historically typical 10–15‐year
lagbetweentheintroductionofvaccinesinrichcountriesandtheir wide-
spread use in poor countries will continue, likely resulting in the loss of
millions of lives of children in poor countries.
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wouldinducefirmstoparticipateinthepneumococcusAMCmechanism.
At first blush, a price equal to the cost of production may seem reason-
able. However, a firm’s reservation price may differ from its production
cost. On the one hand, firms may realize public relations benefits from
selling a product that addresses a major health need of individuals in
poorcountries.Ontheotherhand,firmsmayfearthatiftheysellthevac-
cine at a low price in the poorest countries (like Mozambique) then gov-
ernments in middle‐income countries like Brazil will demand lower
prices as well. This could set up a trickle up of lower prices that could
put a serious dent in firms’ revenues from middle‐ and high‐income
country market sales that represent a different order of magnitude of
potential revenue relative to sales under an AMC.
Such concerns are likely very salient to firms. For example, after
Senator Paula Hawkins (R‐FL) asked a major vaccine manufacturer
how it could justify charging nearly three times as much to the U.S. gov-
ernment for vaccinesas toforeigncountries, U.S.manufacturers stopped
submitting bids to UNICEF to supply vaccines (U.S. Congress, Senate
1982;Mitchell, Philipose,andSanford1993).WhenPresidentBillClinton
announced his plan to immunize all children against a standard list of
diseases in 1993, he said, “I cannot believe that anyone seriously believes
thatAmericashouldmanufacturevaccinesfortheworld,sellthemcheaper
in foreign countries, and immunize fewer kids as a percentage of the pop-
ulationthananynationinthishemispherebutBoliviaandHaiti”(Mitchell
etal. 1993; emphasis added).Inthe face ofsuch statements, potential risks
facing firms seem real.
Setting a price under an AMC is different in the case of technologically
more distant products where no firm has a clear lead. For a technolog-
ically more distant vaccine like HIV, the goal of policy makers is to de-
signanAMCthatwillattractasociallyefficientamountofresearcheffort
tosearchforthevaccine.SettingthepricepaidunderanAMCinthiscase
is not somuch about guessing what firms’ production costs will be in the
future as it is a question of determining the social value of a new vaccine.
Totheextentthattherearemultiplepotentialentrants,ratherthanafixed
set of firms with a technological lead, setting a higher price will not pro-
vide rents to incumbents but will instead attract more R&D effort. Theo-
retically,thereisadangerofencouraging“toomuch”R&Dinthesenseof
duplicationof researchactivities.However,it isoftenappropriateto pur-
sue manydifferent leads simultaneouslyin searchingfor solutionsto im-
portant problems. Moreover, there are in practice many products where
the current level of R&D effort is below the social optimum.
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A second difference between AMC design for close and distant vaccines
arises over whether donors should guarantee some portion of demand.
A general principal of contracting or mechanism design is that whoever
is best placed to affect a risk should, all else being equal, bear that par-
ticular risk. For earlier stage products, firms still have opportunities to
affect product characteristics and thus should bear more risk—implying
that demand guarantees would be less appropriate. For later stage prod-
ucts, the situation is quite different. Once a product has already reached
the stage where pneumococcus vaccines currently are, product charac-
teristics are relatively fixed, whereas the donor community still has the
opportunity to influence demand.
For a technologically close product, like a pneumococcus vaccine, it is
fairly clear what a product will look like, and the main problem is to
incentivize capacity construction. Firms will be more inclined to build
capacity if they know they will be able to sell a volume that will utilize
that capacity, and donors may thus be able to get away with a slightly
lower price if they guarantee demand. On the other hand, it would not
make sense to guarantee demand for a vaccine that is still very techno-
logicallydistant,sinceotherwiseafirmmightwindupcreatingavaccine
that complies with a list of technical specifications but that no countries
would want, and donors might wind up having to buy the vaccine. For
technologically distant products, donors to AMCs arguably should con-
dition payments on countries being willing to use the product and on
some buyer being willing to make a modest copayment (as proposed
above) so as to create incentives for firms to develop vaccines desirable
to consumers. Once a particular product is developed and the problem
shifts to one of capacity construction, donors could then move into a
phase in which they would guarantee a portion of demand. AMCs also
could be linked specifically to capacity installation by firms.
VI. Conclusion
Technological progress is a key determinant of economic growth. Find-
ingwaystoimproveinstitutionstoencouragetechnologicalprogresspo-
tentiallycoulddomoretoencourageeconomicgrowththanvirtuallyany
other area of public policy. While the patent system offers one mech-
anism for rewarding innovation, it involves some important trade‐offs.
In this essay, we argue that incremental experimentation can help to test
and refine new mechanisms to encourage R&D.
Kremer and Williams 14Experimentation and trial and error over time will likely be necessary
to develop and refine new mechanisms to encourage innovation. But
the potential payoffs to adding new mechanisms to our tool kit for en-
couraging innovation are immense, and thoughtful experimentation
with several mechanisms would be valuable.
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1. Other trade‐offsmayarise with patents as well. Forexample, patents may potentially
deterdownstreaminnovationsincontextswhereinnovationiscumulative,inthesensethat
many innovatorswillbuildonpriordevelopments anddiscoveries.Similarissues canarise
in contexts where there are complementarities across innovations in a broader sense; for
more discussion see, e.g., Merges and Nelson (1990), Scotchmer (1991), Heller and Eisenberg
(1998), Murray and Stern (2007), and Bessen and Maskin (forthcoming).
2. Lemley and Shapiro (2005) argue that in this sense patents do not confer upon their
owners a right to market exclusivity but rather confer a right to try to exclude others by
asserting the patent in court.
3. Another approach is a patent buyout, in which a patent is purchased and placed in
the public domain (see Kremer 1998).
4. Itisworthgivingabriefbackgroundonpneumococcaldiseases.Althoughnotaswell
known as malaria or HIV, pneumococcal diseases kill more than 1.6 million people an-
nually, including up to 1 million children under age 5. In rich countries, child deaths from
pneumococcus are rare, but in poor countries pneumococcus is a leading cause of child
mortality. Pneumococcal vaccines for adults have existed for some time, but it is important
to protect children as well, both because of the high death toll among children and because
children areimportantin spreadingthedisease.A pneumococcalvaccinethat protects chil-
dren against some strains of bacteria has been available in the United States for several
years. However, the cost perdose of pneumococcus vaccine in the United States is approxi-
mately $65, far out of reach of poor countries. In addition, existing versions of the vaccine
are optimized to cover the strains of the diseases common in the United States and do not
provideprotectionagainstsomekeystrainscommoninpoorcountries.Twopneumococcus
vaccines were recently licensed (from different suppliers), after the announcement of the
$1.5 billion pilot AMC, although before the legal details of the contract were fully in place.
5. Aidan Hollis, ThomasPogge,andothershaveadvocated aHealthImpactFund proposal,
which is similar to a voluntary version of the proposed Medical Innovation Prize Fund.
6. Many of the examples in this section are drawn from Kremer and Glennerster (2004).
Portions of this and later sections also draw in part on a previous paper written by the authors
for the German Marshall Fund of the United States (Kremer and Williams 2008); those portions
of this essay are adapted withpermission fromthe German MarshallFund ofthe United States.
7. Forexample,whenexantetechnicalspecificationsareusedasarewardtrigger,theywill
almostalwaysneedtobecombinedwithsomesort ofcommitteetomakeanexpostdecision
about whether the technical specifications have been met. In the case of the patent system,
ex post discretion is essentially left in the hands of the legal system (judges and jurors).
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